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Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation
Abstract

Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation:
Asset Limit Changes, Financial Assets, and Vehicle Ownership
Objective. Over the past decade, federal and state governments have substantially
liberalized asset limits in welfare. This paper examines whether this policy change promotes
asset accumulation among the target population of actual and potential welfare recipients.
Methods. Utilizing household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and state data, this
study employs a difference-in-difference approach in order to determine whether state asset
limits affect the target population’s financial and vehicle asset accumulation. This study
develops a new policy measure that considers the time period following the adoption of
liberalized asset limits. Results. Analysis results suggest that increased asset limits may have
successfully encouraged the target population’s asset accumulation. The earlier a state raised its
asset limit, the more likely welfare recipients were to accumulate financial assets and to possess
bank accounts. Conclusion. It is recommended to liberalize asset eligibility rules to promote
long-term economic advancement of poor households.
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Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation:
Asset Limit Changes, Financial Assets, and Vehicle Ownership
Financial assets and physical properties play a critical role in determining a household’s
long-term well-being, especially for low-income households. Assets can improve economic
stability by mitigating the adverse effects of sudden income loss and unexpected expenditures.
They can promote economic development by enabling investment in education and
entrepreneurship. They may improve the social and psychological well-being of asset holders
(Sherraden 1991; Edin 2001; Shapiro 2001). Despite the potential benefits, asset holding among
American households, especially low-income households, is quite low. Thirteen percent of
American households have zero or negative net worth and 16 percent have zero financial assets
(Carney and Gale 2001). Saving rates among poor households are much lower than among highor middle-income households even after controlling for income (Ziliak 2003).
Low levels of asset accumulation among low-income households have been, at least
partially, attributed to asset tests in public assistance programs. Asset tests require households to
keep their financial and vehicle assets below limits set by federal or state governments in order
to qualify for a variety of income maintenance programs. As such, asset tests can be detrimental
to impoverished households by imposing a strong saving disincentive (Ziliak 2003; Neumark
and Powers 1998; Powers 1998; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995).
In recognition of this problem, federal and state governments have substantially
liberalized asset limits in the last two decades (Savner and Greenberg 1995; Corporation for
Enterprise Development 2002). This study investigates whether these liberalizations in asset
tests have stimulated financial and vehicle asset accumulation among the target population of
likely welfare recipients, using household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and state-level data. This paper contributes to the existing research by utilizing a new
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measure of state asset limit policy: the length of time since a liberalized policy has been adopted.
In doing so, it is recognized that states introduced new asset limits at different time-points and
that it might take time for the target population to learn about and adapt to policy changes. The
new measure of policy changes in this study also broadens the approach to understanding the
ways in which new public policies affect the target population.
BACKGROUND
Most public assistance programs in the United States have asset limits in their eligibility
rules. The program typically termed “welfare” [Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) after the PRWORA] is no
exception. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981 set limits at $1,200 for
vehicle asset and at $1,000 for countable assets (cash on hand, values in saving and checking
accounts, bonds, stocks, and vehicle values that exceed vehicle asset limit) at the federal level
and prohibited state governments from raising these limits (Powers 1998). The vehicle asset limit
increased to $1,500 per household later and remained at that level until state governments began
to raise their limits after the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 (Corporation for
Enterprise Development 2002).
Restrictive asset limits have been blamed for low levels of asset accumulation among
poor households. In order to qualify for asset-tested public assistance programs, low-income
households are required to spend down or to maintain their financial and vehicle assets below the
limits. Current and potential recipients, therefore, face strong disincentives to saving. Existing
empirical research suggests that this saving disincentive has operated for various asset-tested
income transfer programs and contributes to low saving rates among low-income households
(Gruber and Yelowitz 1999; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995; Powers 1998; Ziliak 2003). For
Center for Social Development
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example, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey, Powers (1998) studied the effects of
the federalization of the AFDC program’s asset-testing policy in 1981 that dramatically lowered
asset limits in many states. She finds that higher asset limits are strongly associated with higher
savings among current and potential welfare recipients: an increase of $1 in asset limits raised a
female head’s savings by $0.25.
Recognizing the disincentives of asset limits, both federal and state governments began
to liberalize AFDC/TANF asset tests in the early 1990s. The Family Support Act of 1988
allowed states to request a waiver from the federal government to raise asset limits. The
PRWORA of 1996 abolished the federal asset limits for TANF, allowing states to create their
own thresholds (Savner and Greenberg 1995; Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002).
State governments accordingly increased their asset limits in AFDC/TANF during the 1990s 1
(Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002; Savner and Greenberg 1995; Urban Institute
2005). As of the year 2000, 43 states had relaxed their rules on countable asset limits to some
degree and all states had raised vehicle asset limits.
[Table 1 About Here]
A couple of existing studies have empirically tested whether increased asset limits
facilitated asset accumulation among the target population of likely welfare participants
(Sullivan 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006). Using PSID data, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) found that
gaps in asset accumulation between likely and unlikely welfare program participants (femaleheaded households with children vs. other types of households) do not significantly differ

1

Some states introduced special account programs for welfare recipients during the 1990s. These special accounts
have separate and higher asset limits than general accounts but withdrawals are limited to certain types of activities
(e.g., higher education). This study does not include this policy measure because it often overlaps with state
Individual Development Accounts (IDA), an asset-building program (matched saving program) for low-income
households. IDA programs probably affect the asset accumulation of the comparison group in this study (e.g. maleheaded households) as well as the target population (female-headed households with children).
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between states with and without generous asset rules. These findings apply for various asset
measures, including financial assets, possession of a bank account, and ownership of a house or
business. An exception is vehicle ownership: more generous countable asset limits appear to
significantly promote likely welfare recipients’ vehicle ownership. Sullivan (2006) used data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and found that liberalized vehicle
asset limit is associated with an increase in vehicle ownership for single mothers without a high
school degree while relaxation of countable asset limits does not have any statistically significant
association with vehicle ownership. While both studies reach the conclusion that relaxed asset
limits appear to promote vehicle ownership, each identifies a different cause. Hurst and Ziliak
(2006) link increased vehicle ownership with changes in countable asset limits, while Sullivan
(2006) contributes it to relaxed vehicle asset eligibility rules. Both studies conclude that relaxed
countable asset limits have not promoted the target population’s financial asset accumulation.
These two studies focus mainly on the degree of liberalization in asset tests, i.e. the
actual dollar amounts of asset limits. While these measures are valid and valuable, they may not
fully capture the effects of policy changes. Since it may take time for the target population to
learn about and adapt to policy changes, analyses should also take into account the elapsed time
since a policy change has occurred. In addition, states that adopted new asset limits early often
have lower asset limits than states introducing new asset rules later. For example, California
increased its countable asset limit to $2, 000 in 1994, which is much lower than that of North
Dakota ($8,000) or Nebraska ($6,000). These two states raised their countable asset limits in
1998, four years later than California. Given the considerable variation in when state
governments adopted new asset policies, the length of time since policy change occurred may be
even more illuminating than the extent of policy changes at the time of a study.
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This article builds on and expands prior studies of asset tests and asset accumulation
among likely welfare recipients. In addition to measures of policy changes used in the two
existing studies (Sullivan 2006; Hurst and Ziliak 2006), this study includes a new measure of
policy changes: the elapsed time after policy adoption. With this new policy measure, this study
estimates the effectiveness of relaxed asset limits more broadly than previous studies.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
This study combines household data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
with state-level data capturing variation in state-level policies and economic conditions. The
PSID initially interviewed a nationally representative sample of 4,802 families in 1968. Since
then, the PSID has interviewed respondents about economic and demographic characteristics
annually until 1997 and biennially thereafter. When weighted, the sample is designed to be
representative of the non-immigrant U.S. population as a whole (Hill, 1992).
The PSID collects data on households’ assets and liabilities in its wealth supplement. The
PSID’s wealth data contain extensive information regarding assets and liabilities. The wealth
data in the PSID is reported to be of high quality in comparison to other survey data (Curtin,
Juster, and Morgan 1989). The PSID collected wealth data every five years between 1984 and
1999 (in 1984, 1989, 1994, and 1999) and biennially after 1999. This study uses the PSID wealth
data collected in 1994 and 2001 and other household data collected between those years.
This study employs the same sample selection criteria used in Hurst and Ziliak (2006).
The sample is limited to households headed by the same heads who maintained the same marital
status throughout the observation period (1994-2001). Marriage, divorce, and death of spouse
may cause dramatic changes in financial assets and physical properties. The sample is restricted
to households whose heads were 18-44 years old in 1994 and had less than 16 years of education
Center for Social Development
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because they are more likely to receive welfare than other groups. Among female-headed
households, the sample includes only those who consistently have at least one child during the
observation period (female-headed households with children sample) or have no children in any
year for the same period (female-headed households without children sample). Households that
moved from one state to another are excluded from the sample. Ohio residents are removed from
the sample because Ohio was the only state without the countable asset limit as of 2000. 2
The final sample consists of 1,363 households. The sample is divided into two groups:
the target population of likely welfare recipients (277 female-headed households with children)
and a non-target group (1,086 male-headed households and female-headed households without
children). This study does not define the target population based on an individual household’s
welfare experience because welfare rule changes may affect not only current and past welfare
recipients but also households who may potentially receive welfare in the future. Two previous
studies, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) use the same criteria in defining the target
population. The target group received welfare at much higher rates than the comparison group.
Forty-eight percent of the households in the target group received welfare at least once during
the observation period whereas 2 percent of the households in the comparison group did (Please
refer to Table 2 for details).
In addition, this study creates an additional comparison group, consisting of male-headed
households with children (N=565). This comparison group is used in some of analyses to check
robustness of findings. As in the main comparison group, this group’s welfare program
participation was very low (about 2 %). This study also creates another sample for robustness

2

The only difference from Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006) sample is that this study does not exclude those with missing
wealth data. The PSID imputed missing data on wealth and did not provide any indicator of imputation at the time
when the author retrieved data.
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check: a sample composed of households headed by those with less than 13 years of schooling.
This sample consists of 914 households (188 female-headed households and 726 male-headed
household and female-headed households without children). The difference in welfare
participation rates is larger between target and non-target groups in this sample: 56 percent of the
target group ever received welfare between 1994 and 2001 while only two percent of the
comparison group did.
B. Measures
The major independent variables in this study are state-level asset limits in welfare
program. The state welfare policy data were created using various sources, including Savner and
Greenberg (1995) and the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database (Urban Institute 2005). In
creating the state asset limit policy dataset, this study counts policies that applied to the majority
of current welfare recipients for the majority of a year as instances of policy change.
Accordingly, a policy change is counted only if it was applied statewide, not limited to certain
experimental sites in a state. For those states that set different asset limits by family size, this
study uses the asset limit that is likely to have applied to the majority of welfare families (e.g. an
asset limit for a family with two or more members instead of that for a single individual). This
study uses asset limits on current welfare recipients, not those on welfare applicants. Due to
these additional restrictions, the state policy measures used in this study are slightly different
from those reported in Hurst and Ziliak (2006). 3

3

Hurst and Ziliak (2006) use asset limits different from those used in this study for some states. They use an
average of two countable asset limits ($5000, an average of $4,000 for single individuals and $6,000 for households
with two or more members) for Nebraska and use asset limits for welfare applicants for New Hampshire and
Oregon. Their countable asset limit for Washington ($4,000) is different from $3,000 in the Urban Institute (2005)
and State Policy Demonstration Project (http://www.spdp.org/medicaid/table_6.htm). Hurst and Ziliak (2006) utilize
the values of the vehicle limits when states adopted new limits for the first time for three states (North Carolina,
South Carolina, and South Dakota), instead of vehicle asset limits as of 2000. Vehicle limits of District of
Columbia, Mississippi, and West Virginia used in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) are different from those in this study.
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As briefly mentioned above, this study develops two separate sets of asset policy
measures. The first type of measure, which is the dollar amount of the asset limit (as it applies to
countable assets and vehicles) is identical to that used in Sullivan (2006) and Hurst and Ziliak
(2006). For countable asset limit, the variable measuring the actual amount of limits is used in
analyses. Since several states eliminated the vehicle asset limit during the 1990s, this study
creates two vehicle asset limit policy variables: one indicates whether a state has a vehicle asset
limit or not (1 if a state has a vehicle asset limit and 0 otherwise) and the other is a continuous
measure of the actual amount of vehicle asset limit for states with vehicle asset limits (0 for
states without limits). The second set of asset limit policy variables is unique to this study: the
number of years since a new asset limit was introduced for each type of asset. This variable
ranges from zero (for states that made no changes to asset limits) to seven years for countable
asset limits and from two to seven years for vehicle asset limits.
The main dependent variables are financial assets, bank account ownership, and vehicle
assets. This study focuses on financial and vehicle assets because they are counted toward asset
limits in determining welfare eligibility. Welfare systems do not count non-financial assets (e.g.,
home values) or debt into countable assets when determining welfare eligibility (Corporation for
Enterprise Development 2002). Accordingly, the household’s financial and vehicle asset
holdings are the appropriate measure in estimating the impact of asset policy changes. This study
pays attention to bank account ownership since opening a bank account is often the first step in
accumulating financial assets and other types of wealth (Beverly et al. 2003).
In creating financial asset accumulation variables, this study measures change in financial
assets between the observation periods (1994 and 2001), as did Hurst and Ziliak (2006). The
value of the financial asset variable is created by combining the amount of money in
checking/saving accounts and other financial institutes and the cash values of stocks and mutual
Center for Social Development
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funds or investment trust. The values of financial assets in 1994 and 2001 are converted into
constant 1996 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The level of change in financial
assets is created by subtracting the amount of financial assets held in 2001 from that in 1994.
In analyzing financial asset accumulation, this study uses three types of dependent
variables: 1) a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a household achieved any positive
saving in financial assets between the two time periods (1 if any positive changes in the level of
financial assets, and 0 otherwise), 2) the actual dollar amount of change that an individual
household experienced between 1994 and 2001 (in 1996 dollars), and 3) the natural logarithm of
the dollar amount of financial asset change. The third measure, the logarithm of financial asset
change, is unique in this study. This variable is used in Heckman model that investigate the
association between asset policy and the amount of savings while considering the possibility that
those who succeeded in saving may differ from those who did not (e.g., the former may have
learned about asset limit policy changes earlier than the latter). This study uses a natural
logarithm instead of the actual amount because several extremely high values make the
distribution skewed. The third measure has valid values solely for those who have positive
values for the second measure because negative and zero values in the second measure become
missing through the conversion process.
The bank account ownership variable is a dichotomous variable that assigns a value of
one to households that report having any positive value in checking or saving accounts and a
value of zero otherwise. The vehicle ownership variable is created in the same way (1 if a
household reports to own at least a vehicle and 0 otherwise).
C. Analytic Methods: Difference-In-Difference Approach
This study employs a difference-in-difference approach. This approach assesses the
effectiveness of a policy through assessing whether the impact of a policy change on the target
Center for Social Development
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group (likely welfare recipients) is different from the impact on the non-target population (those
with low probability of receiving welfare). The approach thus controls for unobserved
confounding factors, such as state residents’ propensity toward saving. The analytical model is
as follows:
Si = α + β P Pi + βT Ti + βT×P Pi × Ti + β x X i + εi
where Si represents an asset measure for an individual household i
Pi indicates a vector of asset limit policies in the state of an individual household i
Ti is a dummy for the target group
Xi is a vector of control variables, including household and state characteristics
εi is the residual for individual household i
The coefficient on the interaction term between state asset limit and high-risk of
receiving welfare, β T ×P , is the primary interest of this study. It identifies whether and to what
extent the target and comparison groups react in different ways to changes in asset limit policies.
It is expected that the effect of asset limit policies, should they have any effect, will be
concentrated among those with a higher-risk of receiving welfare. If asset limit policies
encourage asset accumulation, especially among the target population, then β T ×P should be
positive and significant, indicating that the state policy environment stimulates asset
accumulation among the target group in a significantly different way from how it affects the
comparison group.
The statistical method of estimation varies with the type of dependent variable. For the
dichotomous dependent variable (e.g. positive change in the level of financial assets, or bank
account or vehicle ownership), this study uses a linear probability model. Results using a logistic
regression or a linear probability model with robust standard errors do not differ substantively
Center for Social Development
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from those reported in this paper. In the analyses with the continuous variable measuring the
amount of changes in financial assets between the two observation periods, this study employs
regressions with bootstrapped standard errors, following Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006). Regression
analyses with robust standard errors do not produce disparate results from those reported in this
paper. Since a few cases with extreme values in the continuous dependent variable may influence
analysis results (Greene 2003), this study runs a series of additional analyses. This study runs the
same analyses reported here after deleting the top and bottom 1 % of the sample and runs median
regressions (Greene 2003). These analyses produce results similar to those reported in this paper.
For the third dependent variable (the natural logarithm of dollar amount of positive savings), this
study uses the Heckman model because of a selection bias: the valid values of this dependent
variable (for those had positive saving) had different characteristics than the others (those with
zero or negative savings) (Greene 2003). This analysis uses bank account ownership in 1994 as
an instrumental variable. Bank ownership at the beginning of the observation is likely to affect
whether an individual household saved or not but not likely to affect how much it saved during
the observation period [Results of additional analyses are available from the author].
Each regression controls for household heads’ characteristics in 1994 (race, education,
and age) and family characteristics (household size in 1994, change in household sizes between
1994 and 2001, average family income during the observation period and its quadric form, and
change in family income between 1994 and 2001). Two measures of state economic conditions
are used in this study: 1) change in state unemployment rates between 1994 and 2001 (based on
the Bureau of Labor Statistics data), and 2) per capita GSP (state equivalent to GDP, available
from the Bureau of Economic Analyses) in 1994. This study also controls for the asset
possession at the baseline (the value of financial assets in 1994 in financial assets regressions,
bank account or vehicle ownership in 1994, in respective regression). This study weighted the
Center for Social Development
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data with 2001 family weight variable (the weight variable of the last observed year) both for
descriptive and multivariate analyses, as recommended by Hill (1992). 4
FINDINGS
Table 2 summarizes household characteristics and the distribution of financial and
vehicle assets in the sample. The target group has lower levels of education and income and
higher levels on household size and number of children in comparison with non-target group.
The target group’s wealth is much lower than that of the comparison group. The average
financial asset value among the former was only about $2,000 in 1994 while the average value
was almost $20,000 among the latter. Only 38 percent possessed a bank account and 62 percent
owned a vehicle in 1994 among the target group, whereas 77 percent and 87 percent of the
comparison group did, respectively. Interestingly, gaps in bank account and vehicle ownership
narrowed between the two groups: the gap fell from 39% in 1994 to 23% in 2001 for bank
account ownership and from 25% to 16% for vehicle ownership.
[Table 2 About Here]
Table 3 reports multivariate analysis results on two dependent variables: the probability
of saving financial assets (positive changes in financial assets) and amount of change in financial
assets between 1994 and 2001. Following the example of Hurst and Ziliak (2006), this paper
estimates the effect of countable asset limits, first. This study conducts two sets of analyses to
capture the effects of the two distinct types of policy measures. Model 1 uses the dollar amount
of countable asset limit as in Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Model 2 utilizes the number of years
since a liberalized asset limit was adopted in a state, a measure unique in this study.

4

This study runs a series of additional models to check the robustness: a model with state dummy variables, a
model using state asset limits for welfare applicants instead of those for welfare recipients, and a model including
IDA program variable (whether a state had state-funded IDA programs or not in 2000). Results from these models
are not substantially different from those reported in this paper.
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Table 3 shows the results of three sets of analyses: 1) analyses using all male-headed
households and female-headed households without children as the comparison group, 2) analyses
based on male-headed households with children as the comparison group, and 3) a sample
consisting of households whose heads have less than 13 years of school. Table 3 reports only key
coefficients of interest: asset limit policy variables, the target population, and the interaction
terms [Full estimation results are available from the author upon request].
[Table 3 About Here]
As shown in the first panel of results, which estimates the probability that a household
will save any financial assets, the coefficient on the interaction term between the dollar amount
of the countable asset limit and the target population indicator is not statistically significant in all
three analyses. This result suggests that a higher countable asset limit does not significantly
increase the target population’s probability of saving financial assets. Results based on the
different measure of asset policy (the number of years elapsed from the adoption of new limit)
tell a different story. The interaction term between the policy variable and the target population
indicator is significantly positive in all three types of analyses (p<0.05). These results suggest
that the longer a liberalized policy change had been in effect, the greater the probability that a
likely welfare recipient had saved financial assets.
The second panel of Table 3 reports results using the continuous measure: the dollar
amount of change in financial assets between the two observed periods. The results based on the
dollar amount of countable asset limit are consistent with those in Hurst and Ziliak (2006). The
coefficients of the interaction term between the target population indicator and policy variable
are not statistically significant in any of three models. In addition, the coefficients of the
interaction term have different signs across models (two are negative and one is positive) as
shown in Hurst and Ziliak (2006). The measure of the elapsed time does not show any significant
Center for Social Development
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effect, either. The coefficients of the interaction term have positive signs (as expected) in all
three models, unlike those based on the dollar amount of asset limit. The coefficients of this
measure range from 1055 to 3883, suggesting that one year early adoption of higher asset limit
may have increased the target population’s saving at least by $1,054.
Table 4 summarizes the results using the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of
financial assets accumulated during the observation period [Full estimation results are available
from the author upon request]. The Heckman model used in these analyses produces two sets of
estimations: one estimates how changes in asset limit policies influence the level of financial
asset savings among those who succeeded in saving financial assets (first panel), and the other
assesses how these policy changes affect one’s probability of being selected into the sample in
the first panel (probability of having positive saving) (second panel). Results from these analyses
suggest that the dollar amount of the asset limit has a significantly positive effect on the target
population’s amount of savings accumulation (as displayed by the statistically significant
coefficients of the interaction term in all six models including this measure). At the same time,
the elapsed time since asset limits were liberalized significantly increases one’s probability of
saving a positive amount of financial assets (as shown in significantly positive coefficients of
interaction terms in all six models that include this measure).
[Table 4 About Here]
These results analyzing financial asset accumulation indicate that asset limit policies
affect potential welfare recipients’ financial asset accumulation in fascinating ways. The more
time that a liberalized policy has existed, the more likely the target population is to save,
suggesting that they need time to learn about and adapt to the policy change. Among those who
managed to save, the more liberalized the countable asset limit policy in the state of residence,
the more financial assets female-headed households with children were able to save, provided
Center for Social Development
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they saved anything. If we can assume that those who succeeded in saving are more likely to be
aware of increased asset limits and to adapt to the policy change than others, this finding
suggests that the level of generosity in asset limit policy may influence the level of financial
asset accumulation among the target population who have learned about and utilized the
opportunities created by this policy change.
Table 5 summarizes results based on two other types of asset accumulation: bank account
and vehicle ownership [Full estimation results are available from the author upon request].
Unlike Hurst and Ziliak (2006), this study includes those who did have own a bank account or a
vehicle in 1994 in the sample because it cannot be assumed without empirical evidence that
states’ decisions about asset limits are not correlated with their residents’ needs for and actual
ownership before policy changes. Therefore, this study uses the full sample in analyzing the
relationship between relaxed asset limit policies and these two types of asset ownership.
Recognizing that those who owned a bank account or a vehicle in 1994 were more likely to do so
in 2001, this study controls for the ownership status of respective property in the base year in the
models.
[Table 5 About Here]
As shown in Table 5, the study produces results identical to those in Hurst and Ziliak
(2006) regarding the relationship between bank account ownership and the amount of countable
asset limit. When measuring the state policy with the traditional measure used in Hurst and
Ziliak (2006), liberalized asset policy does not show a significant effect on the target
population’s probability of having a bank account in 2001. However, the elapsed time since
liberalizing asset limits again shows a statistically significant effect. The interaction term
between the policy variable reflecting time and the target population indicator has a significantly
positive coefficient at the 0.05 level in all three models, indicating that the more time that has
Center for Social Development
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passed since liberalization, the more likely it is that likely welfare recipients possess bank
accounts, ceteris paribus. These results confirm the utility of considering the time dimension as
well as the dollar amount of a policy change in order to understand how a policy affects its target
population.
Table 5 also reports results estimating the probability of vehicle ownership. Relaxed asset
limit policy, either measures with the dollar amount of asset limit or years since a new policy
was adopted, does not show a significant effect on vehicle ownership among female-headed
households with children. Findings on vehicle ownership in this study differ from those reported
by Hurst and Ziliak (2006) who reported that a relaxed countable asset limit raised vehicle
ownership among the target population in a statistically significant way. The discrepancy
between the two studies can be attributed to several factors. While Hurst and Ziliak (2006)
limited their sample to those who did not own a vehicle in 1994, this study uses the full sample
and controlled for vehicle ownership in the base year. As described fully in footnote 3, this study
assigned slightly different values to some states’ countable asset limits from those by Hurst and
Ziliak (2006). This study weighted the data with 2001 family weight variable whereas Hurst and
Ziliak (2006) did not. When replicating Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006) analysis using the same
sample selection criteria (only those who did not own a vehicle in 1994) and same definition of
policy variable without weighting the data, this study obtained results similar to theirs: the dollar
amount of countable asset limits has a significantly positive association with the target
population’s probability of having an automobile. Accordingly, the different results between the
two studies appear to be due to the sample selection criteria, slightly different state asset limit
values, and the use of the sample weight. 5
5

This study also examines the relationship between asset limits and changes in financial and vehicle assets between
1994 and 1999. Neither actual amount of countable asset limit nor the number of years since the new policy
adoption significantly increases the target population’s financial or vehicle assets. The coefficients of the interaction
Center for Social Development
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In order to evaluate whether the relationships between countable asset limit policy and
the target population’s asset accumulation reported above may be artifacts of other policies, this
study conducts analyses that include other welfare reform policies: vehicle asset limit policies,
time-limits on lifetime welfare receipt, and state maximum welfare benefit. Like other analyses
reported above, these analyses replicate Hurst and Ziliak’s (2006) models.
Table 6 summarizes the results for this robustness check, using three different types of
asset accumulation that show significant impacts of liberalized asset limit policy as shown in
Tables 3-5: positive savings in financial assets, natural logarithm of financial asset change, and
bank account ownership. These analyses use all male-headed households and female-headed
households without children as the comparison group. The addition of these policy variables
does not change the main findings regarding the impact of countable asset limits on financial
asset accumulation. As in previous analyses, the elapsed time since liberalization significantly
increases the target population’s likelihood of saving a positive amount of financial assets
(p<0.1) and of owning a bank account (p<0.05). The dollar amount of countable asset limits
show a significant effect in the analysis of the natural logarithm of the financial asset change
(p<0.1).
[Table 6 About Here]
The results of this study suggest there is no statistically significant relationship between
vehicle asset limits and target population’s probability of saving financial assets and of owning a
bank account. None of interaction terms between vehicle asset policy variables (measured either
with the dollar amount or years since the adoption of a new limit) has a statistically significant

terms, however, have the same sign as those reported in this paper in the analyses that show significant effects of
new asset limits on asset accumulation between 1994-2001 (positive coefficient of the interaction with the number
of years after the adoption of a new policy in the positive saving and bank account analyses and positive coefficient
of the interaction term with the amount of asset limit in the logarithm of financial asset saving analysis).
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coefficient. Liberalized vehicle asset limit policies, however, show significantly negative effects
on the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of financial asset change: both interaction terms are
large and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Analysis result on the dollar amount of
financial asset change also show a similar pattern of the relationship with vehicle asset limits: a
positive coefficient of the interaction term with having a vehicle limit and significant and
negative coefficient of the interaction term with the dollar amount of vehicle limit [not reported
in Table but full results are available from the author]. These findings suggest that generous
vehicle assets may lower that target population’s financial asset accumulation if all other things
are equal. Negative effects of liberalized vehicle limits on financial asset accumulation may be
explained with their potential influence on spending on vehicles. It is plausible that generous
vehicle asset limits may have encouraged the target population to spend their financial assets in
buying expensive vehicles and therefore, may have lowered financial assets among this
population. This explanation has not been empirically tested and warrants further investigation.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the impact of liberalized asset limits on asset accumulation among
likely welfare recipients, using two distinct measures of policy liberalization: 1) the generosity
of asset limit policies and 2) the elapsed time during which these liberalized policies have been
in place. The analyses of this study show that liberalized asset limit policies are positively
associated with the target population’s probabilities of saving financial assets and possessing
bank accounts. The longer a liberalized countable asset limit has been in place, the more likely
the target population is to achieve a positive change in financial assets and to possess a bank
account. Analysis results also suggest that the level of generosity in asset limit policy may
influence the level of financial asset accumulation among members of the target population
provided they can save anything. Considering even modest levels of assets can improve the
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quality of life among low-income families (Edin 2001), findings of this study support that we
maintain or expand the liberalization of asset eligibility rules in various public assistance
programs in order to promote long-term well-being of low-income households.
This study may help understand contrasting findings between the two recent studies
(Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 2006) and an older study (Powers 1998). Using the amount of
asset limit measure, Hurst and Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) have shown that asset limits
have essentially no effect on financial asset accumulation. These recent findings run in stark
contrast to Powers’ (1998) study showing that higher AFDC asset limits had a significantly
positive association with likely welfare recipients’ saving.
The differences between Powers (1998) and the two recent studies (Hurst and Ziliak
2006; Sullivan 2006) may be attributable to the distinct characteristics of policy changes studied.
First, the nature of the changes in asset limit policies was quite different: in one case, asset limits
were reduced (made more stringent); in the other, asset limits were raised (liberalized). Powers
(1998) examined the impact of changes in asset limit policies after the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) was passed. In this case, asset limits were reduced in many states,
and welfare recipients, especially those with wealth beyond the newly reduced asset limits,
probably would have learned about policy changes soon after the OBRA took effect because
welfare offices would have informed them about their loss of eligibility. In contrast, Hurst and
Ziliak (2006) and Sullivan (2006) investigated the effects of increased asset limits during the
1990s. In this case, the process by which welfare recipients would learn about policy changes
would have been quite different. Welfare offices do not always provide complete information
about eligibility rule changes to individuals who are not at risk of losing eligibility, and at any
case, learning about the changes would have likely taken more time (Kahn and Polakow 2000).
Furthermore, the two policy contexts have quite different implications for the target population:
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when asset limits are reduced, target households might respond with spending down their
savings in order to qualify for welfare; when asset limits are raised, target households are
expected to respond with reduced consumption and greater savings in order to take advantage of
new opportunities provided by welfare reform. Spending down savings can be done quickly;
accumulating savings takes much longer. In summary, Powers (1998) investigated a policy
change that would have affected the target population immediately after it had been implemented
while the two recent studies (Hurst and Ziliak 2006; Sullivan 2006) examined a policy change
which would have taken time to demonstrate its effects on the target population. The findings of
this study support this explanation by showing that an alternative measure, one reflecting a timedimension, is able to detect policy effects that traditional measures of policy change do not. It is,
therefore, recommended to take into account the time dimension of a policy change as well as
the extent of a policy change in estimating its effectiveness.
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Table 1. State AFDC/TANF Asset Limit Policies.
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D. C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii.
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
N. Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
N. Carolina
N. Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
S. Carolina
S. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Countable Account Limit
Year
Amount
1997
2000
No change
1000
1998
2000
1997
3000
1994
2000
1997
2000
1995
3000
No change
1000
1999
2000
1998
2000
No change
1000
1997
5000
1997
2000
1997
3000
1997
1500
1994
5000
1998
2000
1997
2000
1998
2000
1998
2000
1997
2000
1996
2500
1997
3000
1998
5000
1999
2000
1995
5000
1997
3000
1998
6000
1997
2000
1997
2000
1997
2000
1997
3500
1998
2000
1996
3000
1998
8000
1997
No limit
No change
1000
1996
10000
No change
1000
No change
1000
1997
2500
1998
2000
1997
2000
1997
2000
1996
2000
No change
1000
No change
1000
1998
3000
1998
2000
1997
2500
1997
2500
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Vehicle Limit
Year
1997
1997
1996
1997
1994
1997
1995
1996
1999
1998
1997
1997
1997
1997
1999
1994
1997
1997
1998
1996
1997
1996
1995
1997
1999
1995
1997
1998
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1996
1998
1996
1998
1995
1998
1997
1997
1998
1997
1997
1996
1994
1997
1998
1997
1997
1997

Amount
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
4650
No limit
9500
4650
4650
8500
4650
No limit
4650
No limit
5000
3959
No limit
No limit
10000
No limit
No limit
5000
No limit
7500
4650
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
No limit
9500
No limit
4650
No limit
No limit
No limit
5000
10000
No limit
4600
No limit
No limit
4600
4650
8000
No limit
7500
5000
No limit
10000
12000
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample, Target Group, and Comparison Group

On Welfare in 1994***
On Welfare Between 1994-2001***

0.06
0.08

Target Group
Female Heads with
Children
0.39
0.48

Age ***
African-American ***
Household Size in 1994 ***
Change in Household size (1994-2001)
Number of Children***
% with Children under 17***
Head’s Education in 1994 ***
Less than High School
High School Degree
Some College
Averaged Family Income (1994 and
2001)***
Mean
Median
Change in Family Income (1994-2001)
Mean
Median
Change in State Unemployment Rate (19942001)
Per Capita GSP in 1994 (in $1000) *

34.39
0.20
2.90
0.01
1.19
0.59

31.80
0.61
3.21
0.06
2.08
1.00

34.76
0.14
2.85
0.00
1.06
0.53

0.13
0.51
0.36

0.29
0.37
0.34

0.11
0.53
0.37

$38,709.35
$33.841.96

$13,740.67
$11,859.56

$42,357.22
$39,080.11

$9,184.63
$6,287.39
-1.29

$9,651.91
$7,126.97
-1.34

$9,116.36
$6,138.73
-1.18

27.32

28.03

27.22

$17,191
$1,588

$1,998
$0

$19,411
$2,117

$4,829
$0
0.50

$1,433
$0
0.41

$5,326
$9
0.51

Possessed Bank Account in 1994***
Possessed Bank Account in 2001***

0.72
0.78

0.38
0.58

0.77
0.81

Owned a Vehicle in 1994***
Owned a Vehicle in 2001***
N

0.84
0.87
1,363

0.62
0.73
277

0.87
0.89
1,086

Full Sample

Financial Assets in 1994 ***
Mean
Median
Change in Financial Assets (1994-2001)
Mean
Median
Saved Financial Assets (1994-2001) *

Comparison Group
Male Heads and Female
Heads without Children
0.01
0.02

* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01, t-tests and χ2 tests of differences between the target and comparison
groups.
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Table 3. Countable Asset Limits on Positive Saving and Dollar Amount of Change in
Financial Assets
Comparison Group and sample
composition

Positive Saving (Dichotomous)
Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
thousands)
Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
Target Group
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years
Since Liberalization
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
Years × Target Group
Target Group

A. All male heads and
female heads without
children (fewer than 16
years of schooling)
Model 1
Model 2
0.010
(0.014)
0.041
(0.046)

-0.107
(0.127)

B. Male heads with
children (fewer than 16
years of schooling)
Model 1

Model 2

-0.020
(0.018)
0.075
(0.047)
-0.007
(0.010)
0.054**
(0.026)
-0.220**
(0.108)

Change in Financial Assets (Continuous)
Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
371.60
thousands)
(1428.68)
-1006.65
Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
(2448.87)
Target Group
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years
-1426.20
Since Liberalization
(1258.00)
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
1959.76
(1666.17)
Years × Target Group
-3750.96
-13595.2
Target Group
(9570.92)
(9895.1)
N
1,363

-0.237*
(0.143)

C. All male heads and
female heads without
children (fewer than 13
years of schooling)
Model 1
Model 2
0.018
(0.018)
0.045
(0.065)

-0.029
(0.015)
0.071**
(0.029)
-0.344**
(0.136)

-0.129
(0.166)

0.000
(0.012)
0.078***
(0.029)
-0.323***
(0.117)

-1666.18
(1402.07
1474.47
(2422.07)

1537.35
(2153.54)
-2715.31
(3828.74)

-3293.93
(1837.19)
3883.21
(2245.37)
-17888.1** -30089.8**
(7589.3)
(11975.5)
842

667.23
(1303.41)
1054.54
(1761.92)
2480.83
-7491.07
(9422.94) (13353.43)
914

Standard errors appear in parentheses.
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)

Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

26

Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation

Table 4. Countable Asset Limits on Logarithm of Financial Assets Change Amount
Comparison Group and sample
composition
Ln (Change in Financial Assets)
Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
thousands)
Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
Target Group
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years
Since Liberalization
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
Years × Target Group
Target Group
Selection into positive saving
Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
thousands)
Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
Target Group
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years
Since Liberalization
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
Years × Target Group
Target Group

A. All male heads and female heads
without children (fewer than 16 years
of schooling)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.06
(0.06)
0.74***
(0.27)

-1.49
(0.96)

0.04
(0.06)
0.74***
(0.27)
0.10*
(0.06)
0.22
(0.18)
-0.69
(0.91)

-1.48
(0.96)

0.02
(0.03)
0.13
(0.13)

-0.37
(0.35)

N

B. Male heads with children (fewer
than 16 years of schooling)
Model 1

Model 2

-0.05
(0.10)
0.79***
(0.28)

-1.81*
(0.95)

Model 3
-0.03
(0.09)
0.73***
(0.27)

-0.10
(0.08)
0.44**
(0.20)
-1.79*
(0.95)

-1.62*
(0.94)

-0.05
(0.05)
0.24*
(0.14)
-0.02
(0.03)
0.15**
(0.07)
-0.65**
(0.32)
1,363

-0.02
(0.03)
0.15**
(0.07)
-0.63**
(0.31)

-0.88**
(0.41)

C. All male heads and female heads
without children (fewer than 13
years of schooling)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
0.01
(0.08)
1.45***
(0.55)

-3.87**
(1.77)

-0.01
(0.07)
1.42**
(0.56)
0.07
(0.06)
0.49
(0.31)
-2.71
(1.76)

-3.80**
(1.79)

0.06
(0.05)
0.16
(0.19)
-0.06
(0.04)
0.19**
(0.08)
-1.06***
(0.40)
842

-0.06
(0.04)
0.17**
(0.08)
-0.97**
(0.39)

-0.44
(0.50)

0.00
(0.03)
0.23**
(0.10)
-0.98**
(0.44)
914

0.00
(0.03)
0.22**
(0.10)
-0.96**
(0.45)

Standard errors appear in parentheses.
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 5. Bank Account and Vehicle Ownership: Models with General Account
Limit
A. All male heads and
female heads without
children (fewer than 16
years of schooling)
Model 1
Model 2

Comparison Group and sample
composition

Bank Account Ownership
Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
thousands)
Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
Target Group
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years
Since Liberalization
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
Years × Target Group

Vehicle Ownership
Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
thousands)
Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
Target Group
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years
Since Liberalization
Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
Years × Target Group
Target Group
N

Model 1

-0.002
(0.009)
0.023
(0.040)

Model 2

-0.018
(0.014)
0.041
(0.042)
-0.007
(0.008)
0.049**
(0.022)
-0.117
(0.098)

0.016
(0.115)

Target Group

B. Male heads with
children (fewer than 16
years of schooling)

0.000
(0.006)
0.001
(0.038)

-0.002
(0.012)
0.028
(0.063)
-0.018
(0.011)
0.056**
(0.024)
-0.169
(0.113)

-0.046
(0.126)

-0.003
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.039)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.006
(0.018)
-0.020
(0.070)

0.002
(0.093)
1,363

C. All male heads and
female heads without
children (fewer than 13
years of schooling)
Model 1
Model 2

-0.001
(0.009)
0.047**
(0.030)
-0.092
(0.139)

0.021
(0.175)

0.002
(0.007)
-0.033
(0.054)
-0.006
(0.006)
0.008
(0.018)
-0.118
(0.079)

-0.087
(0.100)
842

0.000
(0.006)
0.001
(0.038)
0.006
(0.006)
-0.024
(0.023)
0.057
(0.091)

0.039
(0.130)
914

Standard errors appear in parentheses.
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed)
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Table 6. Asset Limits and Asset Accumulation: Models with Other Policy Variables
Positive Saving
(Dichotomous)
Model 1
Model 2

Ln (Saved Assets)
(Continuous)
Model 1
Model 2

Model 1

Countable Asset Limit Amount ×
Target Group

0.008
(0.015)

0.008
(0.072)

-0.004
(0.010)

0.046
(0.046)

0.435*
(0.259)

0.052
(0.038)

Any Vehicle Limit

-0.076
(0.089)

-0.946*
(0.498)

-0.092
(0.066)

Any Vehicle Limit × Target Group

0.344
(0.301)

6.507***
(1.625)

0.158
(0.195)

Vehicle Limit Amount (in thousands)

0.009
(0.013)

0.136*
(0.071)

0.007
(0.010)

-0.037
(0.052)

-1.194***
(0.261)

0.017
(0.031)

Countable Asset Limit Amount (in
thousands)

Vehicle Limit Amount × Target
Group

Bank Account
Model 2

Countable Asset Limit Elapsed Years

-0.021
(0.015)

0.085
(0.081)

-0.007
(0.010)

Countable Asset Limit Elapsed
Years × Target Group

0.058*
(0.034)

0.107
(0.270)

0.061**
(0.031)

Vehicle Limit Elapsed Years

0.028
(0.021)

-0.020
(0.116)

0.000
(0.016)

-0.005
(0.043)

0.274
(0.366)

-0.021
(0.037)

Vehicle Limit Elapsed Years ×
Target Group
Target Group

-0.044
(0.230)

N

-0.097
(0.206)

1.040
(1.215)

1,363

0.240
(1.433)
1,363

-0.102
(0.171)

0.037
(0.160)
1,363

Standard errors appear in parentheses.
* p <0.1; ** p <0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed
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